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I. Introduction
In this paper, my aim is to examine the constitutional complaints submitted against the 
Administrative and Labour Courts’ decisions. To understand the legal framework of these 
decisions, first we have to look at the changes in the Hungarian constitutional system after 
the Fundamental Law of Hungary entered into force in 2012. The main changes in the 
functions of the Constitutional Court have to be examined as well as the new three-prong 
system of the constitutional complaints. After having laid out this framework, can one 
really study the types of constitutional complaints submitted against the Administrative 
and Labour Courts’ decisions, especially the ones that are constitutionally significant.
The Fundamental Law of Hungary entered into force the 1st January 2012. Significant 
changes were introduced to the legal system in relation with several institutions.2 New 
institutions and new procedures emerged as old ones disappeared. For instance, the system 
of the ombudsmen was transformed to the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights3 as 
1 This research was supported by the project nr. EFOP-3.6.2- 16-2017- 00007, titled Aspects on the development 
of intelligent, sustainable and inclusive society: social, technological, innovation networks in employment and 
digital economy. The project has been supported by the European Union, co-financed by the European Social 
Fund and the budget of Hungary.
2 Gárdos-Orosz Fruzsina - Szente Zoltán (szerk.): Alkotmányozás és alkotmányjogi változások Európában és 
Magyarországon, Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv Kiadó Zrt., Budapest, 2014. 245-282. p. And a series 
of publications decided to examine these changes, in particular the Constitutional Changes series by the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute for Legal Studies, to mention some of these papers, by the way of 
illustration: BócZ EndrE: Sarkalatos átalakulások 2010-2014 – az ügyészség 1-11. p.; MTA Law Working Papers 
2014/07 Hungarian Academy of Sciences Budapest ISSN 2064-4515 http://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp (15.05.2017.); 
darák PétEr: Sarkalatos átalakulások A bíróságokra vonatkozó szabályozás átalakulása 2010-2014 1-3. p 
MTA Law Working Papers 2014/39, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Budapest, http://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp 
(15.05.2017.); GancZEr Mónika: Sarkalatos átalakulások: az állampolgársági jog átalakulása 1-16. p. MTA 
Law Working Papers 2014/63 Hungarian Academy of Sciences Budapest ISSN 2064-4515 http://jog.tk.mta.hu/
mtalwp (15.05.2017.); PaP andrás lásZló: Sarkalatos átalakulások – a nemzetiségekre vonatkozó szabályozás 
1-16. p., MTA Law Working Papers 2014/52 Hungarian Academy of Sciences Budapest http://jog.tk.mta.hu/
mtalwp (15.05.2017.);
3 Such as: takács alBErt: Az ombudsman eszméje és megvalósulásának formái, Pro Publico Bono 2015/2, 
39-61. p. 47-54. p.
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well as the legal position of the local governments changed.4 The Constitutional Court of 
Hungary (hereinafter: the CC) was one of the affected institutions.
II. The Main Changes in the Functions of the Constitutional Court after 2012
The Fundamental Law of Hungary defined the functions of the CC, and the Act CLI of 
2011 on the Constitutional Court laid down the details.5 The changes affected the judges, 
the institution itself and the jurisdiction of the CC.6 Several researchers decided to form 
an opinion related to the new system.7
The main changes in the functions of the CC could be listed as following.
II.1. The review power of the CC on the amendment of the constitution
The question of unconstitutional constitutional amendments8 could have been examined 
before the fourth amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, although it was clear 
until the 45/2012 (XII. 29.) The examination of the constitutional amendments is not 
 Some opinions have firm criticism against the new system, especially: Majtényi lásZló: A független ombudsman 
intézményeket helyre kell állítani, az alapvető jogok biztosától pedig továbbra is elvárható a jogállami jogvédelem 
9-7. p. MTA Law Working Papers 2014/47., Hungarian Academy of Sciences http://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp 
(2017. 05. 15.); jóri andrás: Az adatvédelmi és adatnyilvánossági szabályozás átalakítása 7-9 p., MTA Law 
Working Papers 2014/34 Hungarian Academy of Sciences Budapest http://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp (15.05.2017.)
4 Pálné kovács ilona: Az önkormányzati rendszer és a területi közigazgatás átalakulása 2010-2013., 1-4. p., 
MTA Law Working Papers 2014/02 Hungarian Academy of Sciences Budapest ISSN 2064-4515 http://jog.
tk.mta.hu/mtalwp (15.05.2017.); BaláZs istván: Az önkormányzatokra vonatkozó szabályozás átalakulása, 
MTA Law Working Papers 2014/03 1-4. p. http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/mtalwp/2014_03_Balazs_Istvan.
pdf (15.05.2017.); sikEt judit: A helyi, területi önkormányzatok közigazgatási autonómiája Magyarországon. 
Történeti és nemzetközi kitekintéssel, figyelemmel a Helyi Önkormányzatok Európai Chartájára. PhD értekezés, 
2017. 95. p.; HorvátH M. taMás: Helyi sarok Sarkalatos átalakulások – A kétharmados törvények változásai 
2010–2014: Az önkormányzatokra vonatkozó szabályozás átalakulása, 1-10. p., MTA Law Working Papers 
2014/04 Hungarian Academy of Sciences Budapest, http://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp (2017. 05. 15.); sZEntE 
Zoltán: Sarkalatos átalakulások – Az önkormányzati rendszer 1-4 p., MTA Law Working Papers 2014/29 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences Budapest ISSN 2064-4515 http://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp (15.05.2017.)
5 The whole Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court is available on the following website in English: http://
hunconcourt.hu/rules/act-on-the-cc (2017. 06. 05.)
6 sZakály ZsuZsa: Az alkotmányjogi panasz elmúlt öt éve. in: Jogvédelmi kaleidoszkóp, A jogvédelem elmúlt 
öt éve (2009-2014) Magyarországon, szerk: Pongó Tamás - Szakály Zsuzsa, Lectiones Juridicae 12, Pólay 
Elemér Alapítvány, 2015, 59-60. p.
7 Especially: tilk PétEr: Az Alkotmánybíróság az Alaptörvényben, in: Közjogi Szemle, 2011/2, 5-14. p.; sPullEr 
GáBor: A Magyar Alkotmánybíróság – a törvényhozás második kamarájából az európai alkotmányos rendszer 
(europäischerVerfassungsverbund) bírósága? Alkotmánybírósági Szemle, 2014/1. 99-104. p.; PacZolay PétEr: 
Megváltozott hangsúlyok az Alkotmánybíróság hatásköreiben, Alkotmánybírósági Szemle 2012/1, 67-69. p.; 
cHronowski nóra: Az alkotmánybíráskodás sarkalatos átalakítása, MTA Law Working Papers 2014/08, 
7-12. p. http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/mtalwp/2014_08_Chronowski.pdf (15.05.2017.)
8 roZnai, yaniv: Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. The Limits of Amendment Powers, Oxford 
University Press, 2017 5-10; roZnai, yaniv: Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration 
and Success of a Constitutional Idea 61(3) American Journal of Comparative Law (AJCL), 2016, 713-719. p.; 
Barak, aHaron: Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, Israel Law Review, Vol. 44. 2011. 332-338. p.
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part of the jurisdiction of the CC.9 Since 2013 that decision established the possibility 
for the examination, although the Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental Law precluded 
this opportunity. However, the question is still preferred in academic discourse.10 While 
previously the actual possibilities for an unconstitutional constitutional amendment were 
minimal and without example, almost every author agreed on the absurdity of the annulment 
of a constitutional amendment. After the events which raised the question11 the picture 
became more ambiguous. As Tímea Drinóczi examined, the events made the scholars think 
differently in some ways.12 The scope of the examination that can be conducted by the CC 
is limited, and the changes in judicial appointments made after 2012 clarified the opinions 
of the new judges meaning that they will not turn to an activist action like what one can find 
in some decisions of the Constitutional Court of Turkey13 or the Supreme Court of India.14
II.2. The judges
Before the Fundamental Law, the CC had 11 members who were elected for nine years.15 
At the moment, the CC has fifteen judges, each elected for twelve years.16 The judges 
elected the president among themselves until 2012, since then the Members of the National 
Assembly elect the President of the CC.17 The possible forms of operation have changed 
as well. Before 2012, only plenary sessions were the form of activity for the CC. After 
 The well-known examples of court case-law can be found in the practice of the Indian Supreme Court and the 
Turkish Constitutional Court.
9 Constitutional Court Decision 1260/B/1997 ABH 1998, 816. p.
10 cHronowski nóra - drinócZi tíMEa - ZEllEr judit: Túl az Alkotmányon… Közjogi Szemle, 2010/4., 7-9. p.; 
drinócZi tíMEa: Gondolatok az Alkotmánybíróság 61/2011. (VII. 12.) AB határozatával kapcsolatban. JURA 
2012/1, 38-39. p.; ZsuGyó viráG: Az Alkotmánybíróság határozata az alkotmánymódosítások alkotmányossági 
felülvizsgálatáról Fogalmilag kizárt-e az alkotmányellenes alkotmánymódosítás? Jogesetek Magyarázata 
2011 hallgatói különszám, 59-62. p.; kocsis Miklós: Az Alkotmánybíróság határozata az alkotmányellenes 
alkotmánymódosítások ügyében. Jogesetek Magyarázata, 2011/3, 9-16. p; sZEntE Zoltán: Az „alkotmányellenes 
alkotmánymódosítás” és az alkotmánymódosítások bírósági felülvizsgálatának dogmatikai problémái a magyar 
alkotmányjogban, Közjogi Szemle, 2014/3. 3-11. p., csink lóránt - FröHlicH joHanna: Egy alkotmány 
margójára - Alkotmányelméleti és értelmezési kérdések az Alaptörvényről, Gondolat Kiadó Kft., 201259-62. 
p; drinócZi tíMEa: Többszintű alkotmányosság működésben – alkotmányos párbeszéd Magyarországon, 
MTA Doktori Dolgozat, 2016. 234-288. p.; BraGyova andrás – Gárdos-orosZ FruZsina: Vannak-e 
megváltoztathatatlan normák az Alaptörvényben?, Állam- és Jogtudomány, 2016/3, 56-62. p.
11 The regular amendments of the constitution which were created to nullify the decisions of the Court related 
to questions of importance.
12 drinócZi 2016, 236-237.
13 roZnai, yaniv – yolcu, sErkan: An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment - The Turkish Perspective: A 
Comment on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Headscarf Decision, 10(1) International Journal of Constitutional 
Law (I-Con), 2012, 182-189. p.
14 roZnai, 2017 42-46. p.
15 Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of Hungary Article 32. (4).
16 Fundamental Law of Hungary 25 April 2011 Article 24. (8).
17 Fundamental Law of Hungary 25 April 2011 Article 24. (8).
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2012, beside the plenary sessions, panels of five and a single judge can also decide on a 
limited number of issues.18
II.3. The new functions of the CC
As there were many modifications in this respect, the following is just a list of some of the 
new powers given to the CC: Examination of the Decision of the Parliament Concerning the 
Acknowledgment of Organisation Performing Religious Activity, Opinion on the Dissolution 
of a Local Representative Body Operating Contrary to the Fundamental Law, Examination 
of Local Government Decrees, Normative Decisions and Orders, and Decisions on the 
Uniform Application of the Law. The CC’s functions have changed in several ways; entirely 
new functions can be found as well as old ones with minor changes related to the experience 
of the two decades of the functioning of the CC.
II.4. Restrictions
“As long as the state debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product, the Constitutional 
Court may […] review the Acts on the central budget, […] for conformity with the 
Fundamental Law exclusively in connection with the rights to life and human dignity, to 
the protection of personal data, to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, or the rights 
related to Hungarian citizenship, and it may annul these Acts only for the violation of these 
rights.”19 The size of state debts can affect the jurisdiction of the CC in exception with some 
different sort of rights. When these declarations became part of the constitution, the debate 
surrounding unconstitutional constitutional amendments peaked again in relation with the 
possible restrictions imposed on the CC. While the results could have been different, the 
CC decided to go along with the original interpretation and not examining the amendments 
of the constitution.20 However, the possibility is still available to the CC to broaden the 
scope of examination as the CC itself did in the beginning of the 90’s.21
III. The Constitutional Complaint
The constitutional complaint was one of the procedures of the CC from 1990, however, 
it was rarely used until 2012. In the system of the Constitution (before the Fundamental 
Law), the most important form of the procedure was the actio popularis, i.e. general ex 
post control of constitutionality of legal norms.22 Constitutional complaints between 1990-
18 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court Article 47. (1).
19 Fundamental Law of Hungary 25 April 2011 Article 37.
20 drinócZi 2016, 235-236. p.
21 sólyoM lásZló: Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Magyarországon, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2001. 445-462. p.
22 Gárdos-orosZ FruZsina: The Hungarian Constitutional Court in Transition – from Actio Popularis to 
Constitutional Complaint, Acta Juridica Hungarica 53, No 4, 2012, 303-307. p.;
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2011 were almost insignificant, unfortunately, only a few important decisions arose from 
this type of the procedure.23
The new Constitutional Court Act created two new procedures. Before 2012, it was only 
possible to file a complaint against the application of a legal norm contrary to the constitution 
as part of a judicial proceeding (now academically called: ‘old’ constitutional complaint). 
One of the new types is academically referred to as ‘real’ constitutional complaint, possible 
to be submitted against judicial decisions in violation of the Fundamental Law, while the 
other one is called a ‘direct’ constitutional complaint against the application of a legal 
provision contrary to the Fundamental Law, or when such legal newly adopted provision 
becomes effective causing a violation of fundamental rights contained in the Fundamental 
Law, without a judicial decision.24
These three types of constitutional complaints became very popular, and due to 
the elimination of the actio popularis rule under the new Constitutional Court Act, the 











1. All Types of Constitutional Complaints arrived and decided (2009-2016). Source: statistics on the website 
of the Court. http://www.alkotmanybirosag.hu/dokumentumok/statisztika/2017 (05.06.2017.)
The constitutional complaints submitted in a year and the constitutional complaints 
decided in the same year have connection in between the numbers. As one can see, the most 
complaints were submitted in 2012, because the elimination of actio popularis allowed the 
petitioners to submit their petitions for a posteriori (ex post) control of constitutionality in 
the form of constitutional complaints if they were affected by the challenged legal norm.26 
After the more than seven hundred cases of 2012, there was a downturn in 2013 only with 
199 cases. Nonetheless, after 2014 the numbers increased again.
The decisions on the constitutional complaints demonstrate the same pattern: great 
increase in 2012, because of the wave of the several former actio popularis motions 
23 Jánosi-case: Constitutional Court Decision 57/1991 (XI. 8.) ABH 1991, 279. p.; Az alkotmányjogi panasz 
kézikönyve, (Bitskey Botond – Török Bernát szerk.), HVGOrac Kiadó, Budapest, 2015, 36-46. p.
24 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court Articles 26-27.
25 From the statistics on the website of the Court. http://www.alkotmanybirosag.hu/dokumentumok/statisztika/2017 
(06.05.2017.)
26 Gárdos-orosZ 2012, 307. p.
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resubmitted in the new form of the constitutional complaint, then a downturn and a 
stabilisation.
Generally, if a complaint is admissible, one of the panels will decide on this, with 
the exception of cases when different circumstances result in the decision of the plenary 
session.27 The new rules on the constitutional complaints created serious discussions in 
academic discourse. Different opinions were formed as an increasing number of decisions 
were submitted.28
IV. Real Constitutional Complaints against the Administrative and Labour 
Courts’ Decisions
Within the above context, following the introduction, I chose the ‘real’ constitutional 
complaints as the topic of my detailed analysis. From 2012, a total of 119 such complaints 
were submitted against the Administrative and Labour Courts’ decisions according to the 
database of the CC.29 I decided to examine these as they paint a more colourful picture, 
and the question of direct constitutional complaints in the practice of the CC was examined 
as well as the old constitutional complaints.30
A total of sixteen ‘real’ complaints were lodged in labour law issues on a variety of 
topics from old-age pension to termination without notice. If petitioners find a legal hiatus 
in the administrative court decision they wanted to question, the possibility of submitting 
a review in the Administrative and Labour Court is open to them. If the petitioner finds 
this decision unlawful, then the possibility of submitting a real constitutional complaint 
becomes available. The scope of the real constitutional complaints that have been filed is 
quite broad as Table 2 shows below.
The majority of the complaints are in relation with the gaming machines. In Hungary, 
the operation of gaming machines is forbidden without a special licence.31 After this law 
27 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court Article 49. (6) Issues on the agenda of the panel shall be submitted 
for decision-making to the plenary session, if
 a) in the matter examined on the merits by the panel the Act must be annulled, or
 b) the conditions specified in Section 50 (2) f) are met, and
 ba) the majority of the members of the panel initiates it,
 bb) the President orders it, or
 bc) five Members of the Constitutional Court who are not members of the given panel initiate it.
 50 (2) f) in all cases where a decision of the plenary session is required by the social or constitutional importance 
or complexity of the case, by upholding the unity of constitutional jurisprudence or by other important reason.
28 vissy BEatrix: Megkötözött szabad kezek, Fundamentum 2014/1-2, 81-84. p.; tilk PétEr: Az új típusú 
alkotmányjogi panasz előzményei és az eljárási renddel kapcsolatos egyes szabályozási elvárások, 
Alkotmánybírósági Szemle 2011/2, 85-90. p.; nasZladi GEorGina: Veszélyben az alkotmányjogi panasz 
jogorvoslati jellege, Fundamentum 2013/1. 81-83. p.
29 The website showed this statistic 20 April 2017.
30 tilk PétEr: Az alkotmányjogi panasz, mint a bíróságok és az Alkotmánybíróság eljárásának kapcsolódási pontja, 
Bírák Lapja, 2002/12. 59-61. p; HalMai GáBor: Az alkotmányjogi panasz – jelen és jövendő?, Bírák Lapja, 
1994/3-4. 45-48. p., köBlös adél: A “régi” típusú alkotmányjogi panasz az új Abtv.-ben, Alkotmánybírósági 
Szemle, 2012/1. 83-88. p.
31 Act XXXIV of 1991 on the Gaming Operation Article 12. (2)
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entered into force, several enterprises tried to operate only with online gambling, and when 
the National Tax and Custom Administration decided against their petitions in accordance 
with the law,32 they tried to find remedy by submitting a constitutional complaint. It happened 
in thirty cases. The arguments of the petitions vary, e.g., in the Decision 3028/2016 (II. 
23.), the CC pointed out that the petitioner argued that the lack of a forensic expert resulted 
in the wrong decision, because important questions of the information technology were 
neglected.33
The next group of nine decisions can be categorized under the keyword of ‘review of 
administrative decisions’. These are general cases, where no other important point was 
emphasised such as significant human rights or the right to the fair trial -, but the petitioner 
argued at the core of the complaint against the decision-making itself.
Complaints submitted in tax law questions form the next group (ten cases). Several 
complaints were lodged against decisions in connection with land (agricultural land) –forests, 
constructions, line easement, etc.-. In some cases, the main point of the complaint was an 
important human right, such as the right to assembly or equal treatment. Finally, there is 
the category of ‘other complaints’, the cases not fitting into other categories: fines, cases 
concerning judicial enforcement officers, campaign contributions, etc.34
V. Main objects of the complaints




Review of administrative decisions 9
Procedural law 8









2. Main objects of the complaints. Source: statistics on the website of the Court. http://www.
alkotmanybirosag.hu/dokumentumok/statisztika/2017 (05.06.2017.)
32 Act XXXIV of 1991 on the Gaming Operation Article 26. (1)
33 Constitutional Court Decision 3028/2016 (II. 23.) ABH 2016, 874, [7]
34 Cases of the „others” category: refugee, public procurement, expropriation, media cases, judicial enforcement 
officials, mine cases, land registry, line easement, campaign contribution, custody, gambling, family doctor 




I chose some cases to describe few of the more interesting problems mentioned in the 
complaints and to show that even a complaint against a decision of the public administration 
could result in an important decision of the plenary session of the CC and could even lead 
to the rectification of unconstitutionality caused by legislative omission.35
V.1. Freedom of Assembly
Several cases were examined by the CC in relation with the freedom of assembly mainly 
because of the Act III of 1989 on the freedom of assembly. This act was a great achievement 
in 1989 (at the time of the transition),36 yet several problems arose since then in the practice 
built on its regulation.37 For instance, according to the act, the planned assembly has to 
be announced three days in advance, which cannot be applied to spontaneous assemblies, 
in line with the recommendations of the OSCE as well.38 The precise rules of the process 
were not specified so the authorities had to decide without proper constitutional guidelines, 
one can find many different decisions in judicial practice.39 According to Barnabás Hajas, 
it would be enough if some of the provisions would be amended or supplemented, then 
the Act could be adequate.40
If someone intends to organise an assembly, it must be announced to the police.41 
The police will decide if the planned event can comply with the conditions of the law. 
There are some conditions in the Act which can result in the prohibition of the assembly 
beforehand,42 and some conditions which can result in the prohibition during the assembly, 
leading to its dissolution.43 The decision of the police can be petitioned to be reviewed in 
the Administrative and Labour Court.44
The CC then can examine the decision of the Administrative and Labour Court in 
case a real constitutional complaint is filed by the person or organization affected by the 
judicial decision and “a) their rights enshrined in the Fundamental Law were violated, 
and b) the possibilities for legal remedy have already been exhausted or no possibility for 
legal remedy is available.”45
35 Constitutional Court Decision 13/2016 (VII. 5.) ABH 2016. 253. p.
36 Badó katalin: A gyülekezési jog értelmezése az Alkotmánybíróság döntéseinek tükrében, Rendészet és emberi 
jogok – 2011/2. 4. p.
37 Hajas BarnaBás: Megjegyzések a gyülekezési jog gyakorlatának irányváltásaihoz, Iustum Aequum Salutare, 
XII. 2016. 4. 45. p.
38 ’It is therefore important that the law does not stifle spontaneous demonstrations by unnecessarily restrictive 
provisions, including those concerning the requirement of prior notice.’ OSCE.
39 Hajas 2016, 44-45. p.
40 Hajas BarnaBás: A gyülekezési jog egyes aktuális elméleti és gyakorlati kérdései, Doktori értekezés, 2012., 
245-248. p.
41 Act III of 1989 on the Freedom of Assembly Article 6.
42 Act III of 1989 on the Freedom of Assembly Article 8.
43 Act III of 1989 on the Freedom of Assembly Article 14.
44 Act III of 1989 on the Freedom of Assembly Article 9.
45 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court Article 27. (1)
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In the examined case, Decision 13/2016 (VII. 5.), the petitioners organised an assembly 
in more than ten places during a day and three of them were prohibited by the police. 
They initiated a review of the police administrative decisions in the Administrative and 
Labour Court.
One of the venues was in front of the Curia of Hungary, which could be prohibited, 
because the Act allows the prohibition if the operation of the parliament or the courts is 
under direct and serious threat. The CC examined this condition in Decision 30/2015 (X. 
15.) and stated that this condition is necessary, but not automatic.46
The other two prohibited venues were in residential areas, and they said that it would 
disturb the right to privacy of the owner of the house and the neighbours.47 The CC recognised 
the dilemmas created by the regulation of the Act again, and decided to take action. The CC 
declared legislative omission that results in violating the Fundamental Law, and called upon 
the Parliament to comply with its duties to remedy this situation until the end of 2016. The 
collision of two human rights (assembly and privacy) resulted in a constitutional conflict of 
the rights, and the CC decided to refer the question to the law-maker, who has the power 
to act in this situation and it became the responsibility of the Parliament to adopt a new 
and proper act on the freedom of assembly until the end of 2016.48
Due to the priority adoption of more extensive procedural laws in the field of 
administrative, civil and criminal procedure laws, the new bill still has not been submitted 
to Parliament, but codification is under way in the Ministry of Justice and it is hoped that 
the legislator will be able to fulfil the obligation imposed by the CC.
V.2. The Role of the Court
Several petitioners tried to seek legal remedy against the unfavourable decisions of the 
Administrative and Labour Courts. The CC drew a line in the sand and decided that there 
would not be a ‘super-court’, a court of fourth instance for the petitioners.49 A per se 
erroneous decision of a court is not enough and the constitutional aspects of the challenged 
judicial decisions would need to be examined, in case the complaints meet formal and 
material conditions (admissibility criteria).50
The alternative material conditions are:
 – if the merits of the judicial decision are significantly affected by a conflict with the 
Fundamental Law;
 – or the case raises constitutional law issues of fundamental importance.51
46 Constitutional Court Decision 30/2015 (X. 15.) ABH 2015, 774, [43]
47 Constitutional Court Decision 13/2016 (VII. 5.) ABH 2016, 253, [4]
48 Constitutional Court Decision 13/2016 (VII. 5.) ABH 2016, 253, [56]
49 Constitutional Court Decision 3325/2012. (XI. 12.) ABH 2012, 1808, [14]
50 dEli GErGEly: A formai és tartalmi követelmények vizsgálata a befogadás visszautasítása során, Forum. 
Acta Jur. et Pol., 2015/2, 38. p.; sulyok taMás – sZakály ZsuZsa: Az alkotmányjogi panasz jogorvoslati 
jellegének bővülése, in: Számadás az Alaptörvényről, Tanulmányok a Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Kar oktatóinak tollából, Balogh Elemér (szerk.), Magyar Közlöny Lap- és Könyvkiadó, 2016, 
362-366. p.;
51 karsai dániEl: A bírói döntést érdemben befolyásoló alaptörvény-ellenesség és az alapvető alkotmányjogi 
jelentőségű kérdés az Alkotmánybíróság gyakorlatában, Forum. Acta Jur. et Pol., 2015/2, 71-72. p.;
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In Decision 3077/2016 (IV. 18.), the petitioner tried to establish the complaint on 
the fact that he was not informed properly about the difference between an appeal and a 
supplement by the public authorities but the CC did not find this argumentation sufficient 
to admit the complaint.52
The principle of legal certainty was cited by several petitioners,53 but the CC stated several 
times that the principle of legal certainty itself is not enough for a successful constitutional 
complaint, only under special circumstances, e.g. in the case of the retroactive effect of 
legislation or the absence of the time for preparations to apply a piece of legislation.54
V.3. The Principle of Equal Treatment
The principle of equal treatment was used in the reasoning of four constitutional complaints 
which are examined hereunder. One of them is remarkable as in this case the petitioner was 
a company which managed a lounge. The establishment introduced a discount favouring 
women (ladies’ night). One of the male guests decided to lodge a complaint because of 
the perceived lack of equal treatment in the company policy introducing the gender-based 
reduction. The practice applied by the establishment was indeed found to be discriminatory 
at first instance by the Equal Treatment Authority.55 The owner of the establishment then 
decided to lodge a review against the decision of the Equal Treatment Authority in the 
Administrative and Labour Court. The Administrative and Labour Court confirmed the 
Authority’s decision.56 The owner then decided to submit a constitutional complaint against 
the court’s decision and he alleged that the decision was discriminative, violated the right 
to property, the right to human dignity and the freedom of enterprise. He argued that he 
just wanted to compensate the lower working wages of women with the advantages in his 
bar and prevent discrimination with the measures he introduced.57
In his decision on this complaint, the CC examined the freedom of enterprise, the rights 
of the legal persons and the possible restrictions of the freedom of property and found 
against petitioner, which means that based on the facts of the case, it is constitutionally 
discriminative to create discounts for female costumers based on their gender. In this case 
the CC declared significant principles regarding the rights of the legal persons and the 
possibility of gender-based discrimination against men.
Another case related to the principle of equal treatment was filed and examined in 
relation to the rights of the child. In a bathing area, the presence of the children under 
the age of sixteen was forbidden in a designated area of the facility that offered these 
services (quiet wellness). The mother of a four-year-old child decided to turn to the Equal 
Treatment Authority, and after the refusal of her complaint, to the Administrative and 
Labour Court. Following the refusal of her case by the Administrative and Labour Court, 
she filed a constitutional complaint to the CC. The CC also found no proper argumentation 
52 Constitutional Court Decision 3077/2016 (IV. 18.) ABH 2016, 1243, [38-39]
53 Such as in the case of Decision 3124/2015. (VII. 9.) ABH 2015, 2139, in relation with competition law.
54 Constitutional Court Decision 3062/2012. (VII. 26.) ABH 2012, 604, [86-91]
55 Decision of the Equal Treatment Authority EBH/545/13/2013.
56 Budapest-Capital Administrative and Labour Court Decision 21.K.30.042/2014/15.
57 Constitutional Court Decision 3001/2016. (I. 15.) ABH 2016, 647, [17]
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is support of the material conditions that we mentioned above, and upheld the arguments 
of the Authority and the Administrative and Labour Court. They both alleged that the use 
of a designated area of a bathing facility is not a basic human right, and the practice of the 
facility therefore was not discriminative.58
VI. Conclusion
To summarize, we can conclude that the CC decided on several real constitutional complaints 
against the decisions of the Administrative and Labour Courts after 2012. The more than 
a hundred cases are extremely divergent, as we could have seen from the analysis as well.
The new possibility of filing these complaints was (and still is) quite popular among 
the petitioners, however, their initial success rate was quite low. This is not surprising, 
though, if we examine the statistics of other European constitutional courts, like that of the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The German court’s jurisprudence has always 
been an example for the Constitutional Court of Hungary from the beginning as well as 
in the formulation of the new method of assessing the admissibility of the new types of 
constitutional complaints.59
The divergence of the possible processes of the public administration can be found 
in the cases as well. The judicial review of public administration decisions is one of the 
cornerstones of the rule of law in a democratic society. The new possibility, that the decisions 
of the regular courts, even the decisions of the Administrative and Labour Courts can be 
examined by the CC created a new step in the system in 2012. Several cases were only 
attempts to find a fourth instance for their case, but these were declined. The CC decided 
against becoming a ‘super-court’, and committed to the principle of only examining the 
constitutional aspects of complaints. As the CC stated in its Decision 3325/2012 (XI. 
12.), “Neither the abstract definition of the rule of law, neither the basic right of the fair 
trail, neither the prohibition of discrimination could create a basis for the Constitutional 
Court to enter in the role of a “Super-Court” which is above the court system and act as 
an ordinary forum of legal remedy.”60
However, one error of public administration can be enough to find serious constitutional 
violations. As we could have seen, the CC has declared legislative omission in violation 
of the Fundamental Law in the case of the freedom of assembly.
The possible ways of the development of the examination of the constitutional complaints 
are depending on several factors, particularly on future petitioners, future petitions and the 
future decisions of public administration these will be based on. The new Act I of 2017 on 
the Code of Administrative Procedure will fundamentally change the system of reviewing 
58 Constitutional Court Decision 3185/2014. (VI. 27.), ABH 2014, 2171.
59 nasZladi GEorGina: A német alkotmányjogi panasz hatása a hazai szabályozásra és az alkotmánybírósági 
gyakorlatra, JURA 2014/1. 236-240. p; Zakariás kinGa: Az alkotmányjogi panasz objektív és szubjektív 
funkciója, Forum. Acta Jur. et Pol., 2015/2. 153-154. p.; vissy 2012, 205-209. p.; csEHi Zoltán: Kérdések és 
felvetések a német típusú alkotmányjogi pnasz magyarországi bevezetése kapcsán, Alkotmánybírósági Szemle 
2011/1. 103-108. p.
60 Constitutional Court Decision 3325/2012. (XI. 12.) 1 ABH 2012, 808, [14]
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the decisions of public administration,61 and it could affect the practice of the CC in terms 
of constitutional complaints against the decisions of the Administrative and Labour Courts, 
but it is still early to state any more than this.
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